In The Christian View of Man, J. Gresham Machen deals with one of the objections often made against the reformed doctrine of divine sovereignty.  The objection comes in two forms.  In the first, Machen anticipates one of the tenets of Open Theism.  In the second, he discussion the objected is it is often conceptualised by Arminians.

Machen writes:

Is not man’s freedom of choice a delusion if all is fixed in God’s eternal plan?

There are those who have been impressed by this objection and have actually regarded the personal choices of persons, especially man, as lying outside the range of the things fixed in God’s eternal purpose.

When God created persons, they have said, He left the persons free; otherwise they would not have been persons at all.

This view may be held in two forms. In the first place, those who hold it may say that God does not even know beforehand what choices the persons whom He has created will make…

The former of these two forms of the theory seems to do away with the omniscience of God.

If God does not know what His creatures, including man, will do, then a wild, unaccountable factor is introduced into the universe. Can that unaccountable factor be isolated? Can we hold that although God does not know what the persons whom he has created will do, yet He can go on governing the rest of the universe in an orderly fashion?

If God does not know what the personal beings in the universe will do, then the whole course of the world is thrown into confusion. God, moreover, on that view, ceases to be God.

He becomes a being who has to wait to see what His creatures will do; He becomes a God who has to change His plans to meet changing circumstances.

Also very unsatisfactory…is the other form in which the theory with which we are dealing has been held.  According to that other form of the theory, while God does not determine or foreordain the actions of the personal beings whom He has created, but leaves their actions to the operation of their free will, yet He does know before what their actions will be.

But the trouble is that if God really created these personal beings, knowing beforehand what, if created, they would do, He did really determine their actions.  Their actions were certain before they did them…

What sort of God is it who merely knows beforehand that His creatures will perform certain actions and yet does not purpose that they shall perform those actions?  Is it not a God who is aware of some necessity outside His own will?  It does look as though that certainty of the future actions of those created persons which enables God to predict their actions must be due either to the purpose of God or to some blind fate, which God knows about but which is indepedent of God.

(The Christian View of Man, p. 36-9)